{"id":28309,"date":"2016-04-27T09:00:33","date_gmt":"2016-04-27T12:00:33","guid":{"rendered":"http:\/\/www.rioonwatch.org\/?p=28309"},"modified":"2019-01-29T12:08:45","modified_gmt":"2019-01-29T15:08:45","slug":"100-days-left-for-the-english-to-see-a-closer-look-at-the-international-awards-and-recognition-of-the-olympic-city","status":"publish","type":"post","link":"https:\/\/rioonwatch.org\/?p=28309","title":{"rendered":"A Close Look at the International Awards and Recognition of the Olympic City"},"content":{"rendered":"

Clique aqui para Portugu\u00eas\"\"<\/em><\/strong><\/a><\/p>\n

The Rio that bid for the 2016 Olympics<\/a> and then reveled in its 2009 campaign victory was not shy of dreaming big. Among other commitments, the city planned to transform city-wide security<\/a>, upgrade<\/a> favelas, reform the broken transportation<\/a> system, and do all of this sustainably with an eye towards mitigating climate change<\/a>. Even a few years before the Olympics itself, these efforts began eliciting a series of awards and recognition from global networks, institutions, companies, and think-tanks.<\/p>\n

In the same pre-Olympic period the city\u2019s marketing<\/a> budget underwent dramatic\u00a0growth. According to the municipal FINCON data system, from 2006 to 2009 the City of Rio spent between R$100,000 and R$800,000 per year on \u201cpublicity, propaganda and social communication.\u201d Mayor Eduardo Paes<\/a> assumed office in 2009. After being awarded the Olympics in late 2009, spending rose to R$29 million in 2010 and had grown to R$127 million for the year by 2015.<\/p>\n

<\/a>
Values not adjusted for inflation. The spike to R$88 million in 2011 was due to a four-year R$120 million contract, signed in 2010 but paid mainly in 2011, with Profissionais de Publicidade Reunidos LTDA. Data from FINCON.<\/figcaption><\/figure>\n

Perhaps it is the City\u2019s marketing team\u00a0that should win an award, because much of the recognition given to Rio policies and projects seemed to take the government\u2019s narrative at face value, demonstrating poor understanding of realities on the ground. For many residents, the popular local expression, \u201cit’s for the English to see<\/a>\u201d–which has its origins in Brazil\u2019s slave trade<\/a> history–seem an\u00a0apt descriptor for\u00a0this moment of global attention on Rio.<\/p>\n

Conversations with Rio residents who are living or studying the daily impacts of some of the globally-lauded policies offer an important lens into understanding the awards and recognitions received by\u00a0this Olympic City.<\/p>\n

The World Bank Commends Pacification in Complexo do Alem\u00e3o<\/h3>\n

\""The<\/a><\/p>\n

In March 2013 the World Bank published a feature story<\/span><\/a> about Complexo do Alem\u00e3o<\/a>\u00a0in Rio’s North Zone<\/a>, describing the immense progress brought about by the <\/span>Pacifying Police Units<\/span><\/a> (UPPs; translated by the World Bank as \u201cpeace-keeping\u201d police force). <\/span>\u201c<\/span>After struggling with violence for 30 years,\u201d the article says, \u201cComplexo do Alem\u00e3o is now a model community.\u201d Done and dusted, problem solved! Sadly, this claim demonstrates the level of contextual understanding we now associate with\u00a0US President George W. Bush\u2019s 2003 \u201cMission Accomplished\u201d speech on the Iraq War.<\/span><\/p>\n

From the installations of UPPs in Alem\u00e3o<\/a>\u00a0in 2012 to the March 2013 World Bank article, police killings like those in <\/span>Fazendinha<\/span><\/a> and <\/span>Nova Bras\u00edlia<\/span><\/a> triggered outrage and <\/span>protests<\/a>\u00a0by community members<\/span> while police were <\/span>among the victims<\/span><\/a> too. Even high-ranking police\u00a0have since admitted <\/span>the policy\u2019s failure<\/span><\/a> in Alem\u00e3o.<\/span><\/p>\n

The World Bank claimed UPPs mean \u201cresidents are able to move about the neighborhood.\u201d But activist <\/span>Thain\u00e3 de Medeiros<\/a>\u00a0of<\/span>\u00a0the community’s media collective, Coletivo Papo Reto<\/a>, argues \u201cone of the main changes was precisely that [after pacification] we couldn\u2019t move freely, that we couldn\u2019t hold our celebrations freely<\/a>,\u201d pointing to the bullets and flash bombs\u00a0that police used on residents during recent <\/span>carnival celebrations<\/span><\/a>.<\/span><\/p>\n

In addition to peace, the World Bank praised the positive impacts of the cable car<\/span><\/a> on mobility. Coletivo Papo Reto<\/a> media activist\u00a0<\/span>Raull Santiago<\/span><\/a> admits that \u201cfor a minority who live at the top of the favela, it\u2019s really useful,\u201d but maintains that \u201cfor a big majority, it\u2019s not.\u201d Thain\u00e3 agrees, saying moto-taxis<\/a> and kombi<\/a> vans remain the most efficient means of transport; the cable cars aren\u2019t accessible for people with mobility limitations and the system is often suspended, due <\/span>to shootings<\/span><\/a> or (supposed) maintenance. <\/span><\/p>\n

For Raull, the cable car was developed for its \u201cstrategic\u201d value \u201cbecause it can be seen from various major points of the city.\u201d Raull also highlights the waste of the large rooms that make up each cable car station. He explained: <\/span><\/p>\n

\u201cIn Alem\u00e3o we have various projects and none, I said NONE, were able to use these spaces for their activities… We were never able to get authorization to use this space, built\u00a0with public money.\u201d<\/p><\/blockquote>\n

The World Bank also highlighted UPP Social<\/span><\/a>, a \u201cWorld Bank-supported initiative\u201d to deliver improved education and health alongside the police. While the new Emergency Care Unit (UPA) provides important services, residents <\/span>RioOnWatch <\/span><\/i>spoke to did not know Alem\u00e3o had any of the \u201cSchools of Tomorrow\u201d lauded by the World Bank. (As of April 22, 2016, the schools\u2019 <\/span>official website<\/span><\/a> contained broken links and had not been updated since 2013.) On the topic of UPPs impacting education, however, Raull points to the <\/span>Caic Theophilo da Souza Pinto school in Nova Bras\u00edlia, which \u201chad a gigantic fall in student numbers after a <\/span>UPP base was installed<\/span><\/a> in the school and the area was the site of intense shooting.\u201d<\/span><\/p>\n

Complexo do Alem\u00e3o artist-activist Mariluce Mari\u00e1 de Souza<\/a> argues that \u201cfrom 2012 to today, [UPP Social] has not existed\u201d in Alem\u00e3o, echoing observations from across Rio\u2019s favelas<\/span><\/a>. She speaks positively about individuals working for UPP Social but adds that the program as it was marketed is \u201cfiction,\u201d which is a shame because in the beginning it was \u201ca serious effort that could have improved social conditions in the community.”<\/span><\/p>\n

Raull, on the other hand, says UPP Social was flawed from the start because \u201cthe police can\u2019t mediate a conflict of which they are a part.\u201d He invites the World Bank to Alem\u00e3o to visit with a resident who \u201cwould show the reality.\u201d For Thain\u00e3, another fundamental issue is the lack of real participation<\/span><\/a> of residents in decision-making:<\/span><\/p>\n

\u201cWe\u2019re always ‘heard,’ the result of which are\u00a0bizarre projects in which the government, when asked, says ‘we did this because we heard you.’ We speak, but we are not understood\u2026 They hear we need mobility, but they don\u2019t hear that the cable car is not mobility. They hear we need health, but the UPA is not health\u2014sanitation and leisure are health! We ask for peace, but the police with rifles and tanks is not peace! To be in the street at whatever hour I like without hearing gunshots is peace.\u201d<\/p><\/blockquote>\n

C40 Awards Rio ‘City Climate Leadership Award’ for Morar Carioca in Babil\u00f4nia<\/h3>\n

\"City<\/a><\/p>\n

Rio\u2019s Morar Carioca<\/span><\/a> program was launched in 2010 with the goal of upgrading all the city\u2019s favelas by 2020–upgrading means bringing in all the missing services these communities are entitled to, and that would bring them up to municipal standard. <\/span>Heavily marketed as a key component<\/span><\/a> of the <\/span>Rio 2016 Olympics<\/span><\/a>\u2019 social legacy, the program <\/span>won<\/span><\/a> the <\/span>2013 City Climate Leadership Award<\/span><\/a> for \u201cSustainable Communities\u201d from the <\/span>C40<\/span><\/a> network of cities. C40\u2019s materials explained that \u201cthis priority of the Rio de Janeiro city government\u201d had a goal \u201cto resettle all those living under risky conditions<\/a>\u201d by 2016, aiming \u201cto keep people within their own communities.\u201d C40 also highlighted the side-by-side communities of <\/span>Babil\u00f4nia<\/span><\/a> and <\/span>Chap\u00e9u-Mangueira<\/span><\/a>\u00a0in the South Zone<\/a> as implied successes of the green sustainability initiative. <\/span><\/p>\n

Now in 2016, however, Babil\u00f4nia and Chap\u00e9u-Mangueira are models of Morar Carioca\u2019s abandonment<\/a>. In 2010 the City drew maps marking residents of areas at high-risk for landslides<\/span><\/a> for relocation within the community. A few of those residents were removed but many others remain. Andr\u00e9 Constantine, president of Babil\u00f4nia\u2019s Neighborhood Association, says \u201cno improvement was made to minimize the risks due to <\/span>heavy rains<\/span><\/a>.\u201d <\/span>In the context of this identified urgent need, investment in (limited) <\/span>solar panels and green architecture<\/span><\/a> had value but also signaled a disregard for community priorities.<\/span><\/p>\n

Not only have residents in risk areas not yet been resettled as promised, but the City recently informed them they will be moved to Santa Cruz<\/span><\/a>, some 65 kilometers away in the <\/span>West Zone<\/span><\/a>, a total about-turn on the original promise\u00a0of local resettlement heralded by C40. As of July 2015, city data showed <\/span>77,206 people<\/span><\/a> had been removed in Rio since 2009; the suggestion that keeping people in their original communities was a priority is incompatible with the fact that over half<\/a> of the recipients of Minha Casa Minha Vida<\/a> public housing–the vast majority of which is two hours away in the city’s extreme West Zone–have been evictees.<\/span><\/p>\n

Although community participation was a pillar of Morar Carioca, Andr\u00e9 explains that\u00a0the City never presented a full project plan, with a timeline and budget, for Babil\u00f4nia; nor have City officials officially informed the community what everyone already appears to know\u2014that further works have been indefinitely suspended. Still, Babil\u00f4nia and Chap\u00e9u-Mangueira received more than most of Rio\u2019s favelas, which never saw<\/span><\/a> any Morar Carioca projects implemented.<\/span><\/p>\n

In response to the C40 award and recognition Morar Carioca has received over the years, Andr\u00e9 states: \u201cThis project is an embarrassment. And to win these prizes, it\u2019s even more embarrassing.\u201d Recognizing that projects which emphasize the environment and sustainability \u201cget a lot of visibility,\u201d he concludes that a major problem in Rio \u201cis that everything is done \u2018for the English to see,\u2019 and things don\u2019t work in reality.\u201d<\/p>\n

Marcia Sales, a resident who is still waiting for the Morar Carioca housing promised to her six years ago, concludes that it would be good if the people who gave the award \u201ccould come [here], because what Morar Carioca is, how Morar Carioca functions, is truly different from what is presented.\u201d<\/p>\n

Mariana Cavalcanti<\/a>, an anthropologist, worked with an\u00a0architecture firm contracted to design and coordinate Morar Carioca implementation in eight West Zone favelas, before the city suddenly canceled the firm\u2019s contract. She reflects: \u201cIt seems, at minimum, irresponsible to give an award to a failure like Morar Carioca.\u201d The award shows the power of \u201cenough beautiful models, plans, and renderings of hyper-real spectacles that the City loves to use\u201d to create \u201ca vicious cycle\u201d in which \u201cthe award helps the City prepare more glorious press releases about its big accomplishments.\u201d<\/p>\n

ITDP\u00a0Awards Rio its ‘Sustainable Transport Award’ for the BRT<\/h3>\n

\"Transcarioca<\/a><\/p>\n

In January 2015 the Institute for Transportation and Development Policy (ITDP) awarded Rio with the Sustainable Transport Award<\/span><\/a>, a prize given annually to \u201cinnovative transportation strategies that protect the environment and improve safety, while enhancing transport efficiency for all users.\u201d The Sustainable Transport Award Committee emphasized Rio\u2019s Bus Rapid Transit (BRT)<\/a> system and the city\u2019s \u201con track\u201d progress \u201cto achieve the goals of its mobility plan by 2016.\u201d<\/span><\/p>\n

As far as schedule goes, two of the four BRT lines, the metro expansion<\/span><\/a>, and the VLT light rail system have all\u00a0<\/span>missed their deadlines<\/span><\/a> for completion. <\/span><\/p>\n

Investment into BRT and bus systems in general reflects an important focus on reducing car traffic by improving public transportation. ITDP’s 2013 impact analysis<\/a> on the first BRT line showed\u00a0significant emissions reductions. However, geographer Christopher Gaffney has argued<\/span><\/a> that the BRT lines, centered on Olympic sites and Barra da Tijuca<\/a>, fail to address the city\u2019s most urgent transport needs. Transport Studies scholar\u00a0Rafael Pereira cautions that studies are still in early stages but says: \u201cFrom the point of view of social participation and the impact these investments have had on local communities, various studies have shown that the result is more negative than positive.\u201d <\/span><\/p>\n

Some whole communities were cleared<\/a> to make way for the construction of BRT lines but effects\u00a0like housing and business displacements are not captured in the ITDP’s impact analysis<\/a>. In\u00a0Cascadura<\/a>\u00a0<\/span>the Transcarioca<\/a> BRT line meant four bus lines with endpoints in Cascadura <\/span>were cut<\/span><\/a>. Businesses that had formed around a key bus depot <\/span>suddenly struggled<\/span><\/a> as commuters were redirected elsewhere.\u00a0Just a couple of months later, <\/span>changes to train services<\/span><\/a> meant fewer trains stopped at the Cascadura station and more commuters had to make transfers on their way to work or school.<\/span><\/p>\n

Now in 2016, Cascadura community leader Jose Fernando Silva believes that \u201cif [the changes] had been well planned, it would have been really good.\u201d However, he adds implementation was poorly executed, such that the overall impact on the area is still \u201cnot positive,\u201d with \u201cno clear schedule\u201d for buses which, when they arrive, are often \u201cvery crowded.\u201d<\/p>\n

Like in Cascadura, a process of \u201crationalization<\/span><\/a>\u201d of buses across the city, in part to stimulate demand\u00a0for new BRT options, and also widely \u00a0understood as an attempt to reduce the flow of low-income residents<\/a> to wealthy areas, has for the most part meant elimination or cuts of existing lines. Even in the regions the BRTs are expected to serve best, like Barra da Tijuca, these changes have caused confusion and immense frustration. <\/span>Five bus lines<\/span><\/a> were cut following the opening of the Transoeste<\/a>\u00a0BRT\u00a0line and ten more were cut in response to the Transcarioca BRT. Locals complain of fewer buses on the remaining lines, unbearably crowded buses, added transfers to formerly direct routes, and the overall lack of information and communication about changes. <\/span>According to an April 2016 article<\/span><\/a>, Pra\u00e7a Seca Neighborhood\u00a0Association president Alexandre Fiani says not one of the six bus lines which used to run directly by the Curupati hospital still passes by the hospital doors.<\/span><\/p>\n

Then there are the complaints with the BRT itself. Fiani says \u201cit\u2019s not possible for an elderly person, a pregnant woman, or a person with disabilities to use the BRT because of the overcrowding.\u201d One commuter called the wait times between BRT and the connecting buses \u201cenormous.\u201d Student and Recreio resident Luiza Lima called the BRT \u201cdangerous and very crowded.\u201d In 2013 the ITDP surveyed<\/a> Transoeste passengers and found overall positive perceptions of changes, but warned even then\u00a0that existing overcrowding and waiting times might only get worse as demand increased.<\/p>\n

Blogger Julia Michaels<\/a> cautions that we don\u2019t know \u201chow much the complaining is due to normal resistance to change and how much to real problems.\u201d However, in an excellent overview<\/span><\/a> of the current “chaos”\u00a0of transport\u00a0she highlights one indisputable problem: \u201cAlmost no one understands what Rio de Janeiro\u2019s ‘bus rationalization’ is about. Almost everyone is at its mercy.\u201d She <\/span>quotes<\/span><\/a> the Rio state Attorney General\u2019s office, which has denounced rationalization on the basis that \u201cwithout correct methodology (\u2018an origin-destination study\u2019), public consultation, a positive user cost-benefit ratio and efficiency monitoring, what we will have is constant consumer indignation and continuous system instability.\u201d<\/span><\/p>\n

Without that data, it\u2019s hard to mount a thorough case against the city\u2019s recent transportation changes, but it\u2019s equally difficult to make a clear case for its benefits.<\/p>\n

Jose from Cascadura questions whether the people behind Rio\u2019s Sustainable Transport Award could truly understand the impacts of recent changes either. When asked what he thinks of the award, he responded: \u201cI really hate it\u2026 They know don\u2019t know our reality, they didn\u2019t speak with us.\u201d He invites them to \u201cvisit in person\u201d and to experience, day after day, what it\u2019s like to navigate Rio\u2019s transportation.<\/p>\n

C40 Elects Eduardo Paes and Rio as Climate Change and Resilience Leaders<\/h3>\n

\""The<\/a><\/p>\n

Ahead of the momentous Rio+20 conference held in Rio in 2012, a publication<\/span><\/a> produced by Brazilian municipal Environment Secretaries asserted: \u201cThe city of Rio de Janeiro has been at the forefront on the issue of climatic change.\u201d Shortly after the C40 recognized Morar Carioca as a sustainability program\u00a0in 2013, Mayor Eduardo Paes was elected the new chair of the network\u2014\u201c<\/span>the world\u2019s leading climate action organization<\/span><\/a>.\u201d In May 2014, he was appointed a member of the Global Commission on Economy and Climate, which, according to City materials, is \u201cintegrated by 21 leaders who distinguished themselves\u201d in this area<\/span>.<\/span><\/p>\n

When asked by RioOnWatch <\/span><\/i>about recognitions for the mayor\u2019s leadership to tackle climate change, biologist <\/span>Mario Moscatelli<\/span><\/a> responded: \u201cThere must be some mistake.\u201d<\/span><\/p>\n

The specifics of Rio\u2019s disastrous sewerage and sanitation systems<\/a> have been well-covered<\/span><\/a> ahead of the Olympics\u2014in part thanks to Moscatelli\u2019s dedicated documentation\u2014so this article will focus more broadly on climate change preparation and the bandied-about term\u00a0\u201cresilience.\u201d<\/span><\/p>\n

Rio is a participating city in the 100 Resilient Cities program<\/span><\/a>, funded by the Rockefeller Foundation. The program defines urban resilience as cities\u2019 capacities to \u201csurvive, adapt, and grow no matter what kind of chronic stresses and acute shocks they experience.\u201d Participation in the program itself is not a claim of success, but rather a signal of claimed commitment to resilience. (It also signals a city\u2019s interest in publicizing that commitment to a global audience.) In <\/span>launching the \u201cResilient Rio\u201d<\/span><\/a> program in January 2015, Paes emphasized projects like the <\/span>macrodrainage<\/span><\/a> of Pra\u00e7a da Bandeira (an area prone to severe floods), an alarm system for risk areas, and the stabilization of precarious slopes around the city. <\/span><\/p>\n

Raul Pinho, an engineer and former director of the sanitation institute Trata Brasil<\/a>, does not believe Rio\u2019s approach to sanitation can bring about resilience: \u201cIn general our political leaders only worry about\u00a0short term actions that bring political results during an administration, which does not align itself with depollution programs for the Guanabara Bay<\/a> and Rio’s beaches, and much less with actions to combat climate change.\u201d He says\u00a0Rio “does not have a long-term policy and hides behind the inefficiency of CEDAE<\/a>\u00a0(water and sewerage utility) to justify the continued delays and failures to deliver fantastical goals.”<\/p>\n

A biologist involved in sustainability initiatives in Rocinha<\/span><\/a>, Gabriel Voto also says Rio lacks a long-term approach. Voto says macrodrainage projects, alarm systems and slope containment works \u201care palliative. They\u2019re important in the short-run but the root causes are not being addressed.\u201d<\/span><\/p>\n

This mirrors a major critique of the IBM-designed Rio Operations Center (COR), which has garnered Rio international marketing<\/span><\/a>, <\/span>attention<\/span><\/a>, <\/span>awards<\/span><\/a>, and <\/span>praise<\/span><\/a> for its \u201cSmart City\u201d efforts, often in the context of <\/span>facilitating resilience<\/span><\/a>. Data collection and well-integrated communication on advanced technology platforms have transformative potential, but the presence of those technologies does not guarantee quality management and project implementation. A forthcoming article by geographer Christopher Gaffney and this author argues the \u201cSmart City\u201d narrative in Rio is oversimplified and thus overstates the COR\u2019s potential, whereas in reality these projects are \u201cnot capable of addressing the most pressing needs of cities with chronic deficits in urban infrastructure and an absence of robust civil society institutions.\u201d<\/span><\/p>\n

Landslide risk is one area where data-collection\u00a0alone definitely doesn\u2019t equate to solutions. Voto reports that in Laboriaux<\/span><\/a> one wall was built to contain the G\u00e1vea slope, but nothing was done to address the precarious hill on the Rocinha side \u201cwhere high-risk housing is located.\u201d Laboriaux joins Babil\u00f4nia and Pica-Pau<\/a>\u00a0as yet another example of how that supposed City priority to relocate all favela residents living in high-risk situations within their own communities by 2016 has been abandoned.<\/span><\/p>\n

Voto warns those who might consider Eduardo Paes and Rio to be leaders in climate change preparations that \u201cmany of the data passed to international organizations are not credible.\u201d For Moscatelli, the reality is in plain sight: for the last 20 years he has flown frequently<\/span><\/a> over Rio to survey the landscape below and \u201conly sees things getting worse\u201d through the \u201ccontamination of all the city\u2019s rivers and the suppression of vegetation,\u201d as just two examples. He concludes: \u201cProbably the city that received praise must have been another city\u2026 in another dimension.\u201d <\/span><\/p>\n

Conclusion<\/h3>\n

One common theme that emerges from these four cases is that awards and praise appear to have been given for ideas and intentions rather than implementation. On paper, the UPPs were bold<\/a> and Morar Carioca was beautiful<\/a>. Rio\u2019s transport system desperately needed change and substantial changes arrived. The city projected to be<\/span><\/a> the Latin American city most severely impacted by climate change has residents and infrastructure that are terrifyingly vulnerable to natural disasters, and Eduardo Paes\u2019 administration wants to be seen as playing\u00a0an important role in tackling this vulnerability. <\/span><\/p>\n

But there is a stark mismatch between how these projects are packaged in marketing materials (by both the City and the international actors who praise them), and how people who live the day-to-day impacts of these policies experience them\u00a0on the ground. It\u2019s not that they were good in theory and bad in practice\u2014there will at times\u00a0be some\u00a0supporters whose lives have been\u00a0transformed for the better. (Although Morar Carioca does stand out for being great in theory and barely existent in practice.) It\u2019s that they are dangerously simplified in marketing and award materials, beyond recognition from the tangled, slow-changing, and controversial reality.<\/p>\n

This simplification is dangerous because it justifies the continuation of poor policies, undermines evaluation and accountability, diverts resources from other policies, and favors politicians who are better at marketing than bringing about positive change. Moreover, it overlooks the participation and even basic feedback of the people most affected in favor of courting \u201cglobal,\u201d \u201cexpert,\u201d \u201cofficial\u201d but often downright clueless praise. The colonial legacy of \u201cfor the English to see\u201d continues<\/a>.<\/p>\n

Unfortunately, the Olympic Games also benefit from poorly grounded recognition. In January the company SGS bestowed<\/span><\/a> the rather opaque \u201cISO 20121 certification\u201d on the Rio 2016 Organizing Committee, for organizing an event that will \u201cleave a positive economic, environmental and social legacy, with minimum waste, energy consumption, or strain on local communities.\u201d The Rio 2016 news article offers zero evidence to justify the award.\u00a0<\/span><\/p>\n

Another key theme that emerges from all four cases are the open invitations laid out by Rio residents for any prospective judges of\u00a0awards: COME VISIT. In each case, the invitation surfaced spontaneously when we interviewed people\u00a0in the areas contemplated by the award in question. Come visit and talk to the real experts on these Olympic City transformations. Without that, you are just the gullible targets of a well-polished, and very well-funded, marketing machine.<\/span><\/p>\n

\"Rio<\/p>\n","protected":false},"excerpt":{"rendered":"

Clique aqui para Portugu\u00eas The Rio that bid for the 2016 Olympics and then reveled in its 2009 campaign victory was not shy of dreaming big. Among other commitments, the city planned to transform city-wide […]<\/a><\/p>\n<\/div>","protected":false},"author":51,"featured_media":28316,"comment_status":"closed","ping_status":"closed","sticky":false,"template":"","format":"standard","meta":{"_monsterinsights_skip_tracking":false,"_monsterinsights_sitenote_active":false,"_monsterinsights_sitenote_note":"","_monsterinsights_sitenote_category":0,"footnotes":""},"categories":[1668,1736,1288,1463,335,1282,452,1869,328],"tags":[2271,1645,9,606,1825,150,1610,371,525,472,1606,32,272,348,1870,324,673,147,197,37,5,15,744,409,2400,12,535,156,471,81,43,200,145,21,365],"writer":[1352],"translator":[],"illustrator":[],"photographer":[],"class_list":{"0":"post-28309","1":"post","2":"type-post","3":"status-publish","4":"format-standard","5":"has-post-thumbnail","7":"category-participationwatch","8":"category-1736","9":"category-highlight","10":"category-perceptions","11":"category-policies","12":"category-research-analysis","13":"category-rio20","14":"category-transit","15":"category-understanding-rio","16":"tag-for-the-english-to-see","17":"tag-piv","18":"tag-9","19":"tag-brt","20":"tag-bus-transport","21":"tag-cable-car","22":"tag-cascadura","23":"tag-cedae","24":"tag-chapeu-mangueira","25":"tag-climate-change","26":"tag-coletivo-papo-reto","27":"tag-complexo-do-alemao","28":"tag-mayor-eduardo-paes","29":"tag-laboriaux","30":"tag-light-rail","31":"tag-marketing","32":"tag-misplaced-public-priorities","33":"tag-morar-carioca","34":"tag-morro-da-babilonia","35":"tag-north-zone","36":"tag-olympics","37":"tag-pacifying-police-unit","38":"tag-policy-critique","39":"tag-public-transportation","40":"tag-resilience","41":"tag-rocinha","42":"tag-sanitation","43":"tag-south-zone","44":"tag-sustainability","45":"tag-transcarioca","46":"tag-transoeste","47":"tag-transportation","48":"tag-upp-social","49":"tag-west-zone","50":"tag-zero-participation","51":"writer-cerianne-robertson"},"_links":{"self":[{"href":"https:\/\/rioonwatch.org\/index.php?rest_route=\/wp\/v2\/posts\/28309","targetHints":{"allow":["GET"]}}],"collection":[{"href":"https:\/\/rioonwatch.org\/index.php?rest_route=\/wp\/v2\/posts"}],"about":[{"href":"https:\/\/rioonwatch.org\/index.php?rest_route=\/wp\/v2\/types\/post"}],"author":[{"embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/rioonwatch.org\/index.php?rest_route=\/wp\/v2\/users\/51"}],"replies":[{"embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/rioonwatch.org\/index.php?rest_route=%2Fwp%2Fv2%2Fcomments&post=28309"}],"version-history":[{"count":0,"href":"https:\/\/rioonwatch.org\/index.php?rest_route=\/wp\/v2\/posts\/28309\/revisions"}],"wp:featuredmedia":[{"embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/rioonwatch.org\/index.php?rest_route=\/wp\/v2\/media\/28316"}],"wp:attachment":[{"href":"https:\/\/rioonwatch.org\/index.php?rest_route=%2Fwp%2Fv2%2Fmedia&parent=28309"}],"wp:term":[{"taxonomy":"category","embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/rioonwatch.org\/index.php?rest_route=%2Fwp%2Fv2%2Fcategories&post=28309"},{"taxonomy":"post_tag","embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/rioonwatch.org\/index.php?rest_route=%2Fwp%2Fv2%2Ftags&post=28309"},{"taxonomy":"writer","embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/rioonwatch.org\/index.php?rest_route=%2Fwp%2Fv2%2Fwriter&post=28309"},{"taxonomy":"translator","embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/rioonwatch.org\/index.php?rest_route=%2Fwp%2Fv2%2Ftranslator&post=28309"},{"taxonomy":"illustrator","embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/rioonwatch.org\/index.php?rest_route=%2Fwp%2Fv2%2Fillustrator&post=28309"},{"taxonomy":"photographer","embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/rioonwatch.org\/index.php?rest_route=%2Fwp%2Fv2%2Fphotographer&post=28309"}],"curies":[{"name":"wp","href":"https:\/\/api.w.org\/{rel}","templated":true}]}}