{"id":71202,"date":"2024-04-18T09:34:27","date_gmt":"2024-04-18T12:34:27","guid":{"rendered":"https:\/\/rioonwatch.org\/?p=71202"},"modified":"2024-04-26T11:07:07","modified_gmt":"2024-04-26T14:07:07","slug":"rio-de-janeiros-militias-and-state-power-part-2-specialists-reflect-on-the-many-facets-of-the-citys-militias","status":"publish","type":"post","link":"https:\/\/rioonwatch.org\/?p=71202","title":{"rendered":"Rio de Janeiro\u2019s Militias and State Power, Part 2: Specialists Describe Their History and Expansion Over Time"},"content":{"rendered":"
\"The<\/a>
The Crime Bureau. Illustration: Latuff<\/figcaption><\/figure>\n

Clique aqui para Portugu\u00eas<\/strong><\/em><\/a><\/a><\/p>\n

Originally published in Portuguese in 2020, this is part two of a two-part article<\/a> that describes the expansion of the state-sanctioned power of vigilante police militias in the Rio de Janeiro Metropolitan Region. Still relevant four years later, with new municipal elections to take place, we publish the article to facilitate international understanding of Rio\u2019s security situation. This second part provides a brief history of the militias from the military dictatorship to present day, examining their methods of infiltrating the State. Click here for part 1<\/a>.<\/span><\/i><\/em><\/p>\n

Militias are no longer merely a parallel power<\/a> in Rio de Janeiro. The level of infiltration and control they hold over the State itself mean today’s militias are central to power in the state. Thus says sociologist Jos\u00e9 Cl\u00e1udio Alves<\/a>, professor at the Federal Rural University of Rio de Janeiro (UFRRJ<\/a>), who has studied the phenomenon for 26 years. But how can this criminal political-social situation in Rio de Janeiro be explained?<\/span><\/p>\n

According to Alves, the influence of militias extends beyond managing black markets, reaching into the realms of political power. They have converted territorial control into political sway, whether in the legislative or executive spheres. An area under militia dominance over the years becomes an electoral stronghold. The connection between legislators and militia men is a political legacy from councilors and deputies linked to death squads from the 1990s<\/a>, alongside their longstanding ties with the police. \u00a0<\/span><\/p>\n

We can see the militia’s growth as a consequence of the historical accumulation of power by extermination squads in Greater Rio de Janeiro’s Baixada Fluminense region<\/a>, now expanded into several other parts of the state, emphasizes Alves. \u201cThe police have always engaged in wholesale killings, operating across many regions and targeting the poor. Regardless of the victim or the justification, [the police] kill, citing the fight against crime and the War on Drugs<\/a>. This has always been the case. What we witnessed [in 2020] was a blatant exposure of this reality with Bolsonarism, transforming this rhetoric into a political agenda,\u201d he underscores.\u00a0<\/span><\/p>\n

\"The<\/a>
The sociologist and writer Jos\u00e9 Claudio Alves.<\/figcaption><\/figure>\n

Militia-controlled areas also serve as a breeding ground for the emergence of leaders\u2014among them, evangelicals linked to religious fundamentalism\u2014who accumulate political capital in these regions. The power and consolidation of the militias result from a complex interplay of economic and social dynamics with various facets spanning decades, explains Alves. This encompasses the discourse that legitimizes violence in society with the mantra \u201ca good criminal is a dead criminal<\/a>,\u201d to the agenda of arming the population<\/a> and approving the justification of unlawfulness, ensuring police impunity in criminal cases<\/a>. Meanwhile, the fragmentation of the opposition leaves adversaries unable to effectively respond to this crisis of political and social representation.<\/span><\/p>\n

In addition to these layers and processes, Jos\u00e9 Cl\u00e1udio Alves highlights the significant influence of militias within neo-Pentecostal evangelical groups in the favelas and peripheral areas. \u201c<\/span>When you take a close look at the occupants of these ministries, you’ll notice that those in influential positions today were, and continue to be, historically excluded from the dominant structures of society. The evangelicals there have always seen themselves as outcasts, pariahs of sorts. Perceived and treated as outsiders, they now identify echoes of themselves, of other ‘helpless souls like them,’ currently holding positions of power,\u201d<\/span> Alves explains.<\/p>\n

According to him, religious fundamentalism has gained significant ground because the religious realm has become one of the few spaces where the destitute and poor population has managed to connect with a social structure for salvation. Cast \u201cinto the basin of souls\u201d by the neoliberal State model, which eroded and dismantled social protection in areas like employment, income, housing, and urban mobility, the poorest found solace in the neo-Pentecostal churches. Moreover, these churches have come to occupy a crucial emotional role for this segment of the population in the face of the State’s dismantling.<\/span><\/p>\n

\"Church<\/a>
Church of the Kingdom of God in Rocinha where a CT scanner was installed during the Marcelo Crivella administration. Photo: Michel Silva\/Fala Ro\u00e7a<\/em><\/figcaption><\/figure>\n

\u201cGradually, everything was handed over to the private sector, placing the burden on the shoulders of the poorest\u2014the vulnerable who have nowhere and no one to turn to. They found solace in the church,\u201d emphasizes the UFRRJ professor.<\/span><\/p>\n

Additionally, there are the spoils of mega-events<\/a>, left by past administrations as an inheritance for the militias. They learned, both from and within the State, how to \u201cturn the city into a big business for wealth extraction,\u201d says Alves.<\/span><\/p>\n

According to him, the state of Rio is currently operated by \u201cmilitia geopolitics,\u201d spreading across many parts of Greater Rio, with a particular concentration in the West Zone<\/a> and municipalities of Greater Rio’s Baixada Fluminense<\/a>, including Duque de Caxias<\/a>, Japeri<\/a>, Nova Igua\u00e7u<\/a>, Belford Roxo<\/a>, Queimados<\/a> and Serop\u00e9dica<\/a>. These cities are linked by the Arco Metropolitano<\/a>, which connects to the Port of Itagua\u00ed. In this dynamic, militias have also begun to operate<\/a> in the North Zone, while discreetly extending their influence into the state capital’s South Zone<\/a>.\u00a0<\/span><\/p>\n

Militia-controlled areas in the North Zone serve as operational centers, allowing them to organize and fight over territories with drug traffickers. Militias, allied with other criminal factions such as the Pure Third Command, have come into conflict with the Red Command<\/a>.<\/span><\/p>\n

Typically consisting of Military<\/a> and Civil Police<\/a> officers, as well as members of the Fire Department, militias control approximately 25.5% of Rio\u2019s neighborhoods, totaling 57.5% of the city\u2019s area<\/a>. This data comes from a study<\/a>\u00a0carried out by the Fluminense Federal University\u2019s Study Group on the New Illegalities (GENI<\/a>\/UFF), Fogo Cruzado<\/a>, USP\u2019s Center for the Study of Violence<\/a>, news platform Pista News<\/a><\/span> and crime-fighting hotline Disque-Den\u00fancia. In addition to their presence in Rio, militias extend their control to territories and cities in the Metropolitan Region.<\/p>\n

\"Map<\/a>
Map of the Metropolitan Region of Rio de Janeiro. Source: Renata Gracie, ICICT-Fiocruz<\/figcaption><\/figure>\n

Today, militias are present in 15 Brazilian states<\/a>. \u201cIf you look at their structures, they always act according to the logic of the wealthy in that region. So, as they move further into the countryside, militia groups collaborate with agribusinesses, large land owners, oligarchs, and mining groups<\/a>,\u201d says Alves.<\/span><\/p>\n

Scuderie Le Cocq, CPI for Militias and Elections<\/h3>\n

In 2009, the Parliamentary Commission of Inquiry (CPI) on Militias led to the arrest of 246 militia men<\/a> in Rio, a threefold increase from the previous year’s 78<\/a> arrests. The CPI prompted paramilitary groups to adopt a more discreet approach, described as \u201clow-key<\/a>\u201d in a study<\/a> by the Rio de Janeiro State University’s (UERJ<\/a>) Laboratory for the Analysis of Violence (LAV<\/a>).<\/span><\/p>\n

However, the crackdown de-escalated after 2010, reaching its lowest point with just 55 arrests in 2013, according to a joint report by Piau\u00ed <\/em>magazine and Ag\u00eancia Lupa<\/em><\/a>. \u201cThe CPI should persist over time. While it has its merits, it is limited, being a political action restricted to the parliamentary sphere,\u201d says Alves.<\/span><\/p>\n

In 2019, a specialized task force from the Rio de Janeiro State Public Prosecutor\u2019s Office dedicated to fighting militias accused 1,060 individuals and arrested 336<\/a> for their involvement with these groups. Since 2012, Brazilian legislation has defined militia activity in Article 288<\/a> of the Penal Code. However, this classification is outdated. Law 12,720 recognizes militia activities as \u201ca crime related to the extermination of human beings,\u201d but today’s militias are involved in a much broader spectrum of crimes. As a result, most militia wrongdoings lack adequate legal provisions.<\/span><\/p>\n

According to a study<\/a> conducted by Forum Grita Baixada<\/a>, 25 people connected to politics in the Baixada Fluminense were assassinated in the 60 months preceding 2020. The Forum examined newspaper reports and websites, identifying murder cases<\/a> of individuals linked to politics in the region since 2016 (the period since the previous municipal elections). The survey revealed that, between 2016 and November 10, 2020, 25 pre-candidates, candidates, public policymakers, and electoral officials were assassinated in the region<\/a>.<\/span><\/p>\n

To Luiz Eduardo Soares<\/a>, an anthropologist specializing in public security policy and the former National Secretary of Public Security, this militia-state has historical roots in the Scuderie Le Cocq<\/a>. This death squad, composed of Rio police officers, sought to avenge the death of detective Milton Le Cocq and other police officers. Officially founded in 1984 under the guise of \u201cimproving morals and serving the community,\u201d the group’s existence, however, traces back to the military dictatorship<\/a>. In the 1960s, 1970s, and 1980s, their \u201coperations\u201d earned them the notorious label of a death squad<\/a>.<\/span><\/p>\n

\"\"<\/a><\/span>\u201cIn the 1960s, Le Cocq became a \u2018serpent\u2019s egg.\u2019 Operating mainly in the Baixada Fluminense, executing alleged criminals, they became guns-for-hire, serving local politicians for personal reasons or engaging in economic activities, functioning as professional hitmen. They were police officers, trained in torture and assassination to eliminate political opponents of the military regime. With the end of the dictatorship, however, they returned to their original battalions without ever having ceased being part of the State,\u201d said Soares in the webinar \u201cMilitias and Electoral Capture<\/a>,\u201d organized by Foro Intelig\u00eancia<\/a>.<\/span><\/p>\n

The group also had branches in S\u00e3o Paulo<\/a> and Vit\u00f3ria, in the state of Esp\u00edrito Santo. Scuderie Le Cocq was dissolved in 2004 by the Federal Court<\/a> following a request from the Federal Prosecutor’s Office. However, it reemerged in 2015 as the “Scuderie Detective Le Cocq Philanthropic Association<\/a>,” aiming to “provide legal assistance to police accused of a crime while carrying out their duties and to advocate for the repeal of the Disarmament Statute.”<\/p>\n

Democracy vs. Dictatorship<\/b><\/h3>\n

\u201cIn the transition to democracy, we were mediated and negotiated. We moved straight into reconciliation, sweeping our wounds under the rug. We transitioned directly into the new regime, which was inaugurated with the 1988 Constitution<\/a>. The representatives of the military government who still had some influence positioned themselves in the field of public security and in organizational structures forged by the dictatorship,\u201d says Soares.<\/span><\/p>\n

This legacy, as Soares explains, endures. The lack of restructuring in post-dictatorship police institutions meant that several illegal procedures were left unchanged. Without this reorganization, a culture persisted within the police, regardless of the regime’s end, coexisting with democracy. \u201cIndividuals\u2014men and women\u2014with values and action protocols forged in the previous structure [of the dictatorship], have incorporated this model of policing as a culture and practice.\u201d<\/span><\/p>\n

\"The<\/a>
Anthropologist and former National Secretary of Public Security, Luiz Eduardo Soares<\/figcaption><\/figure>\n

\u201cPublic security was not affected by the transition to democracy. The past coexists, as strong, resistant, and intractable as ever, alongside the democratization of Brazilian society. It\u2019s a paradoxical design, a dichotomy and a duality,\u201d ponders Soares.\u00a0<\/span><\/p>\n

Soares highlights the challenge for civil society to fully grasp the severity of the militia issue, emphasizing that maintaining a \u201cnegligent and complicit silence\u201d is no longer acceptable. In Brazil, particularly in Rio\u2014both in the capital and across the entire state\u2014\u201croutine episodes of police violence\u201d would not persist if numerous segments of society did not acquiesce to State violence.<\/span><\/p>\n

\u201cFrom a sociological standpoint this might be interesting but in practice, it\u2019s appalling for the Brazilian people. We live in the depths of this conflict and clash, with republican institutions accepting the unacceptable and society cheering on this fascist, brutal culture. We live in a much more complex democratic culture than we can imagine; we are neither one thing nor the other,\u201d says Soares.<\/span><\/p>\n

Military Intervention vs. Militias<\/b><\/h3>\n

According to both Luiz Eduardo Soares and Jos\u00e9 Cl\u00e1udio Alves, the 2018 federal intervention in Rio<\/a> by the Armed Forces<\/a> fell short of dismantling militias because the State itself serves as the backbone and enabler of these militia groups. Both scholars point to the execution of Marielle Franco<\/a> on March 14, 2018\u2014an elected councilor with over 46,000 votes, born and raised in the Mar\u00e9<\/a> favela complex\u2014as a glaring example.\u00a0<\/span><\/p>\n

Soares asserts, \u201cThe Armed Forces, theoretically capable of independently safeguarding Brazilian democracy, prove both unable and, ultimately, uninterested in intervening. And if there is any semblance of independence, it hasn\u2019t materialized in practice. The assassinations of Marielle and Anderson Gomes stand as the most chilling indicators of militia insubordination.\u201d\u00a0<\/span><\/p>\n

\"\"<\/a>\u201cThe deaths of Marielle and Anderson occurred during the federal intervention in Rio, a time when General Braga Neto<\/a>, [in 2020] Brazil’s Chief of Staff, was orchestrating a political project with national aspirations. This shows that these influential figures were already in the early stages of organizing,\u201d says Alves.<\/span><\/p>\n

\u201cMarielle’s case still hasn\u2019t come to light in full. The military intervention<\/a> failed to unearth the full extent of this crime, crucial to the city’s history and social justice,\u201d he continued.<\/span><\/p>\n

[During the 2020 interview] Alves asserted that, \u201cBrazil is living an anti-democracy disguised as democracy\u2014deceiving and imprisoning everyone in a charade. Bound to this conception of democracy, as we open a door expecting a garden of rights, we find ourselves unlocking the doors to a basement full of skeletons.\u201d<\/span><\/p>\n

With a series of setbacks, the investigation into the assassination of Marielle Franco and her driver Anderson Gomes dragged on for years without a clear resolution<\/a>. While two individuals had been accused of carrying out the crime, the motivations behind it and the identities of those who orchestrated it remained elusive [until March 2024]. According to the investigation, the councilor’s death is linked to militia groups associated with the Crime Bureau<\/a>.\u00a0<\/span><\/p>\n

This is part two of a two-part article<\/a> that described the expansion of militias as part of State power in Greater Rio de Janeiro in 2020, but still relevant prior to municipal elections of 2024. <\/i>Click here for part 1<\/a>.<\/i><\/em><\/p>\n

\n

Support\u00a0<\/b>RioOnWatch<\/i><\/b>\u2019s tireless, critical and cutting-edge hyperlocal journalism, online community organizing meetings, and direct support to favelas\u00a0<\/b>by clicking here.<\/a><\/b><\/h4>\n","protected":false},"excerpt":{"rendered":"

Clique aqui para Portugu\u00eas Originally published in Portuguese in 2020, this is part two of a two-part article that describes the expansion of the state-sanctioned power of vigilante police militias in the Rio de Janeiro […]<\/a><\/p>\n<\/div>","protected":false},"author":234,"featured_media":71243,"comment_status":"closed","ping_status":"closed","sticky":false,"template":"template-full.php","format":"standard","meta":{"_monsterinsights_skip_tracking":false,"_monsterinsights_sitenote_active":false,"_monsterinsights_sitenote_note":"","_monsterinsights_sitenote_category":0,"footnotes":""},"categories":[335,1282,336],"tags":[2119,460,1700,280,163,1692,479,694,595,3690,552,3131,2496,1197,2597,1709,34,2449,1259,1105,2657,918,33,37,122,809,1698,1402,406,1631,156,268,651,2809,1385,21],"writer":[3125],"translator":[3475,3192],"illustrator":[],"photographer":[],"class_list":{"0":"post-71202","1":"post","2":"type-post","3":"status-publish","4":"format-standard","5":"has-post-thumbnail","7":"category-policies","8":"category-research-analysis","9":"category-violations","10":"tag-armed-forces","11":"tag-baixada-fluminense","12":"tag-belford-roxo","13":"tag-complexo-da-mare","14":"tag-cpi","15":"tag-crime","16":"tag-democracy","17":"tag-duque-de-caxias","18":"tag-elections","19":"tag-espirito-santo","20":"tag-evangelical-church","21":"tag-fogo-cruzado","22":"tag-forum-grita-baixada","23":"tag-greater-rio","24":"tag-jair-bolsonaro","25":"tag-japeri","26":"tag-luiz-eduardo-soares","27":"tag-marielle-franco","28":"tag-mega-events","29":"tag-military-dictatorship","30":"tag-military-intervention","31":"tag-military-police","32":"tag-militia","33":"tag-north-zone","34":"tag-nova-iguacu","35":"tag-public-security","36":"tag-queimados","37":"tag-legacy","38":"tag-sao-paulo","39":"tag-seropedica","40":"tag-south-zone","41":"tag-state-violence","42":"tag-uerj","43":"tag-ufrrj","44":"tag-violence","45":"tag-west-zone","46":"writer-tatiana-lima","47":"translator-ethan-kaimana","48":"translator-ikrom-alajoulin"},"_links":{"self":[{"href":"https:\/\/rioonwatch.org\/index.php?rest_route=\/wp\/v2\/posts\/71202","targetHints":{"allow":["GET"]}}],"collection":[{"href":"https:\/\/rioonwatch.org\/index.php?rest_route=\/wp\/v2\/posts"}],"about":[{"href":"https:\/\/rioonwatch.org\/index.php?rest_route=\/wp\/v2\/types\/post"}],"author":[{"embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/rioonwatch.org\/index.php?rest_route=\/wp\/v2\/users\/234"}],"replies":[{"embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/rioonwatch.org\/index.php?rest_route=%2Fwp%2Fv2%2Fcomments&post=71202"}],"version-history":[{"count":0,"href":"https:\/\/rioonwatch.org\/index.php?rest_route=\/wp\/v2\/posts\/71202\/revisions"}],"wp:featuredmedia":[{"embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/rioonwatch.org\/index.php?rest_route=\/wp\/v2\/media\/71243"}],"wp:attachment":[{"href":"https:\/\/rioonwatch.org\/index.php?rest_route=%2Fwp%2Fv2%2Fmedia&parent=71202"}],"wp:term":[{"taxonomy":"category","embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/rioonwatch.org\/index.php?rest_route=%2Fwp%2Fv2%2Fcategories&post=71202"},{"taxonomy":"post_tag","embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/rioonwatch.org\/index.php?rest_route=%2Fwp%2Fv2%2Ftags&post=71202"},{"taxonomy":"writer","embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/rioonwatch.org\/index.php?rest_route=%2Fwp%2Fv2%2Fwriter&post=71202"},{"taxonomy":"translator","embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/rioonwatch.org\/index.php?rest_route=%2Fwp%2Fv2%2Ftranslator&post=71202"},{"taxonomy":"illustrator","embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/rioonwatch.org\/index.php?rest_route=%2Fwp%2Fv2%2Fillustrator&post=71202"},{"taxonomy":"photographer","embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/rioonwatch.org\/index.php?rest_route=%2Fwp%2Fv2%2Fphotographer&post=71202"}],"curies":[{"name":"wp","href":"https:\/\/api.w.org\/{rel}","templated":true}]}}