{"id":77966,"date":"2024-04-29T10:28:03","date_gmt":"2024-04-29T13:28:03","guid":{"rendered":"https:\/\/rioonwatch.org\/?p=77966"},"modified":"2024-05-03T18:34:24","modified_gmt":"2024-05-03T21:34:24","slug":"expansion-of-the-militias-homicides-in-the-west-zone-increase-by-44-highlighting-a-new-crime-landscape-in-rio-de-janeiro","status":"publish","type":"post","link":"https:\/\/rioonwatch.org\/?p=77966","title":{"rendered":"Vigilante Militias Spread Across Rio de Janeiro: Homicides in the West Zone Increase by 44% Highlighting a New Criminal Landscape Where Drug Traffickers and Militias Collide"},"content":{"rendered":"
\"Charred<\/a>
Charred bus shells litter the landscape between the Antares and Cesar\u00e3o favelas in the West Zone of Rio de Janeiro; approximately 35 buses were torched in the area, following the death of a key militia leader. Photo: Reproduction from social media<\/figcaption><\/figure>\n

Clique aqui para Portugu\u00eas<\/i><\/span><\/em><\/span><\/i><\/span><\/a><\/h4>\n
The phenomenon of police officers operating outside the law and organizing armed groups in Rio de Janeiro is not a recent one, with records dating back to at least the 1950s<\/a>. Extermination groups, involving police officers, firefighters, and municipal guards, active or retired, have been operating for decades in the Baixada Fluminense<\/a> and other areas of Greater Rio<\/a>. These groups presented themselves as community protectors, as private guarantors of public security. In exchange, they enforced security fees, initially optional, to be paid by the residents of the “protected” territories. Over time, these fees became mandatory, enforced through threats, violence, and even death against those who refuse to comply. Additionally, militias have expanded their activities to include public services and illegal businesses, such as: alternative transportation<\/a>, provided by vans; clandestine Internet<\/a> and cable television service<\/a>, known as “gatonet<\/a>“; monopoly of the supply of cooking gas<\/a>; and real estate development<\/a>. It is well known that the actions and rapid expansion of these paramilitary groups have contributed to increased violence and corruption in Rio de Janeiro.<\/h5>\n
\"Number<\/a>
Number of legalized units (2009-2020) by Administrative Region and militias in the city of Rio de Janeiro. Map: GENI\/UFF<\/figcaption><\/figure>\n

The Emergence of the Militia<\/h3>\n

In this article, we explore the challenges and potential strategies for addressing the growth of militias in Rio de Janeiro, drawing insights from Silvia Ramos<\/a>, a sociologist and coordinator of the Center for Studies on Public Security and Citizenship (CESeC<\/a>).<\/p>\n

Ramos explains that the emergence of militias<\/a> occurred in the 1950s, with extermination groups<\/a>. In the 2000s, it took on a new guise. Still comprised of law enforcement agents or former agents, militias purportedly aimed to “provide” protection. A counter-narrative was thus created, based on the presence of armed men and threats to law offenders by the militia, suggesting that in the spaces they dominated there would be no circulation of drug dealers or drug sales. Therefore, these favelas and working-class neighborhoods were portrayed as less dangerous, free of shootings or confrontations with the police<\/a>. Initially, State agents colluding with militias would go door-to-door collecting voluntary security fees from residents. However, “the fees became mandatory and those who did not pay were threatened… and those who did not heed the threats were killed,” Ramos describes.<\/p>\n

With this, a new fa\u00e7ade emerged for the criminal network. According to Ramos, militias began to involve politicians, such as Natalino<\/a> and Jerominho<\/a>, who were linked to the exploitation of alternative transportation in the West Zone<\/a>. Ramos emphasizes that many state deputies were not militia members themselves, but were elected in areas dominated by the militia.<\/p>\n

\n
\"Who<\/a>
Who are the members of the Braga family militia? Source: Folha de S\u00e3o Paulo<\/em><\/figcaption><\/figure>\n

“Starting in 2014, the phase where militias were solely composed of police officers came to an end, and militia members began taking over areas previously controlled by drug traffickers, one of the first being Tr\u00eas Pontes, in the West Zone. Carlinhos Tr\u00eas Pontes<\/a> entered first, followed by his brothers, Ecko<\/a>, and Zinho<\/a> [leader of Rio’s largest militia<\/a>].” \u2014 Silvia Ramos<\/p><\/blockquote>\n

According to the sociologist, there was a fragmentation that resulted in a dispute between the militia and other powers, such as the Red Command (CV), a prominent drug trafficking gang, leading to alliances with its rival faction<\/a>, the Pure Third Command (TCP). Consequently, entire areas, especially in the West Zone and the Baixada Fluminense, are exposed to armed conflicts between militias and other criminal factions<\/a>.<\/p>\n

“These disputes result in high mortality rates. Homicide rates from January to September 2023, compared to January to September 2022, in the two areas of the West Zone, saw an increase in intentional, violent deaths of over 150%, indicating preexisting dynamics.” \u2014 Silvia Ramos<\/p><\/blockquote>\n

Another complicating factor was the fragmentation of the militia in the West Zone, with devastating effects on the lives of residents. Rival militia gangs began to compete for territories and power. This power struggle translates into frequent shootouts, acts of violence, and summary executions. New alliances and enemies, creating a complex scenario among different groups, make the war between factions even more unpredictable and lethal. This also results in an arms race\u2014the growing caliber and lethality of weapons employed by gangs\u2014in a constant pursuit to eliminate rivals. As firepower intensifies, so does the ability of these weapons to cause harm.<\/p>\n