{"id":83966,"date":"2026-08-31T11:14:14","date_gmt":"2026-08-31T14:14:14","guid":{"rendered":"https:\/\/rioonwatch.org\/?p=83966"},"modified":"2026-09-04T12:19:18","modified_gmt":"2026-09-04T15:19:18","slug":"just-prior-to-elections-rio-de-janeiro-state-legislature-revives-wild-west-bonus-and-elects-its-author-chair-of-human-rights-commission","status":"publish","type":"post","link":"https:\/\/rioonwatch.org\/?p=83966","title":{"rendered":"Prior to Elections, Rio de Janeiro State Legislature Revives \u2018Wild West Bonus\u2019 and Elects Its Author Chair of Human Rights Commission"},"content":{"rendered":"
\"Protesters<\/a>
Protesters march against the October 2025 \u2018Containment\u2019 police operation in Rio de Janeiro, holding signs. The sign in the photo reads: \u201cIt wasn\u2019t an operation, it was murder!\u201d Photo: Valter Campanato\/Ag\u00eancia Brasil<\/em><\/figcaption><\/figure>\n

Clique aqui para Portugu\u00eas<\/strong><\/i><\/em><\/i><\/em><\/a><\/h4>\n

This article is part of a series on the 2026 Brazilian elections<\/a>, focusing on the perspectives of Greater Rio\u2019s favelas.<\/em><\/p>\n

Whether in 1995 or 2025: The \u2018Wild West Bonus\u2019 Is an Electioneering Measure<\/h3>\n

In September 2025<\/a>, lawmakers aligned with former Governor Cl\u00e1udio Castro<\/a> in the Rio de Janeiro State Legislative Assembly (ALERJ<\/a>) introduced a bill to reinstate a measure first established in 1995 and abolished in 1998: the \u2018Wild West bonus<\/a>.\u2019 Bill 6027\/2025<\/a> rewards police officers who carry out extrajudicial executions of suspects. The bonus, ranging from 10% to 150% of officers\u2019 salaries, has sparked outrage and protests<\/a>. Activists also view it as an electioneering measure.<\/p>\n

Although the bill was vetoed by then-Governor Cl\u00e1udio Castro, the veto was overturned by his own base<\/a> through a political maneuver within ALERJ. State Deputy Dani Monteiro<\/a>, then-chair of ALERJ\u2019s Human Rights Commission<\/a>, said that the vote, approval, veto and subsequent overturning of the veto on the \u2018Wild West bonus\u2019 were met with surprise by all members of the commission, which was not even consulted.<\/p>\n

\u201cThe whole thing was a political maneuver. Cl\u00e1udio Castro, who is now ineligible<\/a> to run for office, led the largest massacre in the state of Rio de Janeiro<\/a> in the favelas of Complexo do Alem\u00e3o<\/a> and Complexo da Penha<\/a> [in the North Zone<\/a>]. It was a true bloodbath\u2026 We were shocked by the sudden vote and approval of the \u2018Wild West bonus\u2019 and quickly filed a legal action to block such an arbitrary law, which proved completely ineffective in the past. It has been proven time and again that this is no way to fight crime. The \u2018Wild West bonus\u2019 would not only further increase police lethality but also encourage bad public officials involved in organized crime to commit homicides without the risk of being punished. And the state of Rio de Janeiro already holds the record for killings by public security agents.\u201d \u2014 Dani Monteiro<\/p><\/blockquote>\n

\"Original<\/a>
Original artwork by David Amen<\/figcaption><\/figure>\n
\"Marcello<\/a>
Marcello Alencar foi governador do estado do Rio de Janeiro entre 1995 at\u00e9 1999, pelo PSDB. Foto: Governo do Estado do Rio Marcello Alencar served as governor of the state of Rio de Janeiro from 1995 to 1999 as a member of the PSDB. Photo: Rio de Janeiro State Government<\/figcaption><\/figure>\n

Originally created by then-Governor Marcello Alencar<\/a> (1995\u20131999) in 1995, early in his term, the \u2018Wild West bonus\u2019 rewarded military and civil police officers for neutralizing criminals and for so-called \u2018acts of bravery.\u2019<\/p>\n

Elected with the support of President Itamar Franco<\/a> (1990\u20131994), Alencar appointed retired Army General Nilton Cerqueira<\/a> to head public security in the state of Rio. In doing so, the governor chose to resume the policy of confrontations in favelas, which had been rejected by his predecessor<\/a>, Leonel Brizola<\/a>.<\/p>\n

To reward the officers who killed the most in these confrontations, Marcello Alencar created a bonus for civil and military police officers, nicknamed the \u2018Wild West bonus.\u2019 The logic behind the bonus was this: since there was corruption within the police force, it was believed that if officers were offered money to engage in confrontations, they would refuse money from organized crime.<\/p>\n

Guilherme Pimentel Braga<\/a>, lead attorney for DefeZap, a service that provides access to justice and documentation in cases of State violence in Rio de Janeiro, highlights the countless ways in which this system can be abused:<\/p>\n

\u201cThey sell it as a solution, but it\u2019s a false solution; in fact, it\u2019s part of the problem. Police lethality actually strengthens criminal factions. Studies already demonstrate this; Cambridge University itself published a study<\/a> last year showing that State violence\u2014especially police lethality\u2014strengthens factions. And we can look at this in various ways. For example, police lethality can be a way of eliminating witnesses\u2014in other words: security agents involved in crime who boost criminal activity, executing people who, if arrested alive, could expose criminal schemes that strengthen factions. Aside from silencing people, another example is that police killings can be a mechanism for increasing the amount of protection money, right? If the police suddenly decide to increase the amount they extort\u2014that is, the money they charge for protection\u2014and the gang refuses to pay, then they go in and, through police lethality, force the people involved in crime to pay more, you see? Or it could even involve a murder-for-hire service, a hitmen scheme: in other words, we get paid by one faction to kill people from other factions. Or [the police] selling out a favela [dominated by one faction] to another.<\/p>\n

We know that police lethality is, in fact, a mechanism that intensifies crime in peripheral areas. And we also know that the people controlling these areas aren\u2019t the ones paying protection money. The people in control are the ones receiving protection money. So this whole debate about \u2018let\u2019s rid these areas of factions\u2019 is a false one. They create both the problem and the solution. We know how weapons end up there.\u201d<\/p><\/blockquote>\n

\"During<\/a>
During a protest led by favela residents after the massacre on October 31, 2025, in Complexo da Penha, the sign reads: \u201c[Favela] residents are not criminals.\u201d Photo: Vin\u00edcius Ribeiro<\/figcaption><\/figure>It is no wonder that the homicide rate in Rio de Janeiro in 1995 was the highest ever recorded<\/a> in the state\u2019s history: 61.7 per 100,000 inhabitants. And all of this happened in a democratic country, where there is no death penalty and where it is illegal to kill. Therefore, to legally justify their actions, police forces began to use the legal mechanism of the auto de resist\u00eancia<\/em> (resistance incident report). Created during the military dictatorship<\/a>, the term referred to \u201cjustifiable homicides\u201d committed during confrontations, presumably in self-defense, and was used to cover up the regime\u2019s murders. Thus, although there is officially no death penalty in Brazil, the law nonetheless covered up\u2014and has returned to covering up\u2014these murders.<\/p>\n

Just as in the run-up to the 2026 elections, back in the 1990s, the Wild West bonus was accused of being an electoral ploy and populist. Marcello Alencar was accused of offering a simplistic and supposedly quick fix for a historic crisis. Others criticized the government for merely seeking to inflate \u201cpolice productivity\u201d metrics without actually improving public safety conditions. Above all, the measure was seen as a desperate attempt to mask the lack of a public safety strategy, intelligence capabilities, infrastructure and better pay for police officers.<\/p>\n

In addition, within police ranks, the measure was also criticized for distorting hierarchy. In the 1990s, officers complained that the bonuses allowed subordinates to earn more than their superiors, discouraging criminal investigation and intelligence work, which was more methodical, efficient and safer, but did not yield direct financial gain for officers.<\/p>\n

Another unexpected effect that also contributed to the unpopularity of Marcelo Alencar\u2019s administration was the perversion of policing fueled by the Wild West bonus. As a result, death squads grew stronger and found a source of public funding for their activities, especially in the Baixada Fluminense<\/a> and the rest of the Greater Rio<\/a> region.<\/p>\n

And it was precisely due to this controversial history and its limited effectiveness in fostering a sense of security and improving public safety indicators that, shortly thereafter, during Anthony Garotinho<\/a>\u2019s administration (1999\u20132002), State Deputy Carlos Minc<\/a> (PSB<\/a>) succeeded in getting the State Legislative Assembly to approve the elimination of the Wild West bonus.<\/p>\n

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Um post compartilhado por Carlos Minc (@carlos.minc)<\/a><\/p>\n<\/div>\n<\/blockquote>\n