{"id":84280,"date":"2026-10-14T09:16:23","date_gmt":"2026-10-14T12:16:23","guid":{"rendered":"https:\/\/rioonwatch.org\/?p=84280"},"modified":"2026-10-16T09:23:52","modified_gmt":"2026-10-16T12:23:52","slug":"a-brief-history-of-40-years-of-public-security-failures-in-the-state-of-rio-since-brazils-return-to-democracy-part-2-policies-failed-to-deliver-solutions-2007-2026","status":"publish","type":"post","link":"https:\/\/rioonwatch.org\/?p=84280","title":{"rendered":"A Brief History of 40 Years of Public Security Failures in the State of Rio Since Brazil\u2019s Return to Democracy, Part 2: Policies Failed to Deliver Solutions [2007-2026]"},"content":{"rendered":"
\"From<\/a>
From 2007 to 2026, the governors of the state of Rio de Janeiro were S\u00e9rgio Cabral, Luiz Fernando Pez\u00e3o, Wilson Witzel, Cl\u00e1udio Castro and Ricardo Couto.<\/figcaption><\/figure>\n

Clique aqui para Portugu\u00eas<\/em><\/strong><\/a><\/p>\n

This article is part of a series on the 2026 Brazilian elections<\/a>, focusing on the perspectives of Greater Rio\u2019s favelas.\u00a0<\/em>It is also the second installment of a two-part article on the history of public security failures in Rio de Janeiro since Brazil\u2019s return to democracy.<\/em> Read Part 1, covering 1983\u20132006, here<\/a>.<\/em><\/p>\n

In the first part of this article<\/a>, we examined the administrations from 1982 to 2006, focusing on the post-1985 redemocratization period and covering the years from Brizola to Rosinha Garotinho. Now, in this second part, we will examine the failures of the past 20 years of the state’s public security policies, from 2007 to 2026, spanning the administrations of S\u00e9rgio Cabral to Ricardo Couto.<\/p>\n

S\u00e9rgio Cabral (2007-2014)<\/h3>\n
\"Governor<\/a>
Governor S\u00e9rgio Cabral. Photo: Rio de Janeiro State Government<\/figcaption><\/figure>\n

S\u00e9rgio Cabral<\/a> took office as governor of the state of Rio de Janeiro in 2007, proposing a reform of Rio de Janeiro\u2019s Military Police<\/a> through the launching of the Pacifying Police Units<\/a> (UPP<\/a>s), in theory, a permanent community policing force in favelas. His proposal was to remove armed groups from certain favelas, establish a permanent police presence and then bring public services and social policies to these areas.<\/p>\n

Initially, it seemed to work. The main figure associated with the implementation of the UPPs<\/a> was a drop in the homicide rate. On the other hand, there were reports of various types of abuse<\/a>, including in relation to favela culture through Resolution 013<\/a>, and worse: torture<\/a>, extrajudicial executions<\/a>, militarization of daily life in favelas<\/a> and criticism of the public security policy\u2019s territorial selectivity<\/a>.<\/p>\n

The UPP program envisioned a second phase, the UPP Social<\/a>, aiming to provide favelas with quality public services\u2014which never happened<\/a>. Apart from a few modest, isolated initiatives, the UPPs never progressed<\/a> beyond the initial phase. After the Olympics, the program had already collapsed<\/a>.<\/p>\n

One of the most striking violations of this period took place in 2013, with the torture and death<\/a> of Amarildo Dias de Souza<\/a>. A resident of Rocinha<\/a>, the bricklayer was detained by UPP police officers<\/a> and disappeared<\/a>. His body was never found. The events took place in the presence of most of the unit\u2019s force<\/a>, including its commander, Major Edson Santos<\/a>. Other police officers who were not at the scene heard Amarildo\u2019s screams as he was tortured. In the streets, the 2013 protests<\/a> demanded answers: \u201cCabral, you crook, where is Amarildo?<\/a>\u201d Fifteen police officers were charged<\/a> and 12 were convicted of the crime<\/a>.<\/p>\n

Other parallel programs under the Cabral administration included: in 2014, Detached Police Companies in Niter\u00f3i<\/a> and Pra\u00e7a Seca<\/a>, intended to provide community-based and preventive policing in sensitive areas; initially launched as the Lapa Security on the Ground Operation<\/a> in the city’s central region<\/a>, the Security on the Ground<\/a> program was created in January 2014; and in 2015<\/a> the Integrated Proximity Policing Company (CIPP<\/a>), nicknamed the \u201cUPP of the Asphalt<\/a>,\u201d which aimed to bring community-based policing and crime prevention to the streets of business and residential neighborhoods.<\/p>\n

In short, S\u00e9rgio Cabral invested in militarization and confrontation throughout Rio. Police killed 1,330 people in 2007<\/a>. Armed Forces personnel were also made available by President Lula<\/a> and, later, President Dilma<\/a>. The military was deployed in Rio on eight occasions between 2008 and 2015. In one of these, Complexo da Mar\u00e9<\/a> was occupied by the Army<\/a>. It was a bleak period in the lives of Mar\u00e9 residents<\/a>, which only ended in 2015<\/a>, already under the administration of Cabral\u2019s successor and vice governor, Luiz Fernando Pez\u00e3o<\/a>.<\/p>\n

Luiz Fernando Pez\u00e3o (2014-2018)<\/h3>\n
\"Governor<\/a>
Governor Luiz Fernando Pez\u00e3o. Photo: Fernando Fraz\u00e3o\/Ag\u00eancia Brasil <\/em><\/figcaption><\/figure>\n

In 2014, the new Governor Luiz Fernando Pez\u00e3o<\/a> said there would be no shortage of funding for public security. Faced with a lack of resources, however, he had to turn to the federal government. President Michel Temer<\/a> signed yet another decree authorizing federal intervention in Rio de Janeiro.<\/p>\n

With the federal intervention in 2018, General Walter Braga Netto took on operational control of the state police forces, while the Armed Forces took part in several operations, including in favelas. The official justification was the breakdown of public order amid escalating violence and the state government\u2019s inability to adequately respond to the crisis.<\/p>\n

In 2018, Pez\u00e3o began partially dismantling the UPPs<\/a>. The federal intervention office signaled its intention to reassign UPP police officers to detached police companies<\/a>, linked to local battalions, to cover the same areas. This brought an end to the attempt at community-based policing, with bases established in favelas, and marked a return to the old model of sporadic incursions, with troops deploying from and returning to battalions and police stations.<\/p>\n

In February 2019, a bill providing for the complete dissolution<\/a> of UPPs began making its way through the Rio de Janeiro State Legislative Assembly (Alerj), but did not advance. In the years that followed, what remained of the UPP program was gradually dismantled<\/a>.<\/p>\n

On November 29, 2018, Pez\u00e3o was placed in pretrial detention<\/a> by order of the Superior Court of Justice (STJ) as part of Operation Car Wash. He was the first Rio de Janeiro governor to be arrested while still in office<\/a>. Vice Governor Francisco Dornelles took over Guanabara Palace on an interim basis for about a month, until a newly elected governor took office.<\/p>\n

Wilson Witzel (2019-2020)<\/h3>\n
\"Governor<\/a>
Governor Wilson Witzel. Photo: Rio de Janeiro State Government<\/figcaption><\/figure>\n

In the 2018 elections, a candidate for governor of Rio de Janeiro made a bold and controversial campaign promise, much like Moreira Franco had done in 1986. Wilson Witzel<\/a>, a federal judge unknown to voters until then, promised to put an end to violence once and for all by eliminating criminals: \u201cthe police will aim at their little heads and\u2026 fire.<\/a>\u201d Witzel was elected in the runoff<\/a>, defeating Eduardo Paes<\/a>.<\/p>\n

In addition to authorizing the killing of suspects, the governor abolished the State Public Security Secretariat<\/a>, splitting it into two departments: the Civil Police Secretariat and the Military Police Secretariat. This drew widespread criticism from experts<\/a>, who argued that the move hindered coordinated action\u2014from planning operations to sharing intelligence\u2014and fueled rivalries between the two police forces.<\/p>\n

High police lethality drove the number of deaths to record levels. As a result, favela movements<\/a> and human rights organizations took the matter to the Federal Supreme Court (STF), which imposed restrictions on police operations in favelas<\/a> during the pandemic through a Claim of Non-Compliance with a Fundamental Precept (ADPF 635<\/a>), better known as the \u201cADPF of the Favelas<\/a>.\u201d<\/p>\n